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TACKLING MARKET ABUSE
Market Abuse was first introduced as part of the
programme of developments brought in by the Financial
Services and Markets Act 2000. Since then its definition
has seen significant revision as a result of the Market Abuse
Directive, which in turn led to changes in the relevant UK
legislation. The essence of the statutory regime however
has remained the same, which is that certain types of
behaviour are deemed to be in breach of it and are dealt
with under a civil enforcement regime, though in some
cases the behaviour could alternately lead to criminal
charges. This leaves the FSA with the power to take steps
against FSA authorised persons and firms together with
anyone else who has committed market abuse. The
purpose behind the original statute and the subsequent
Directive was the effective combating of certain types of
economic crime. This was largely motivated by the lack of
success the Criminal Justice Act 1993 (and the preceding
law) had shown in prosecuting insider dealing.
One issue that arises is that of the nature of a civil
offence. It is not an approach that has traditionally been a
significant part of English law. Essentially, there is a civil
burden of proof coupled with a potentially unlimited fine.
It was believed by some observers that this would facilitate
the pursuit of wrongdoers. However, a common
misconception is that as it is a civil offence, the burden of
proof is that of the balance of probabilities. To quote
Denning LJ in Bater v Bater:
“A civil court, when considering a charge of fraud, will
naturally require a higher degree of probability than that
which it would require if considering whether negligence were
established. It does not adopt so high a degree as a criminal
court, even when it is considering a charge of a criminal
nature, but still it does require a degree of probability which
is commensurate with the occasion.”
Therefore, in those cases where the market abuse alleged
would also be a criminal offence, a higher burden of proof
than the balance of probabilities will be required in the
FSA tribunal. In most cases this has not become an issue as
most of those facing market abuse charges have co-
operated and accepted disciplinary action. However, in
those casers where matters are disputed, proof may be less
easy than some have supposed.
Inevitably, the recent developments in this area of law
raise the issue of how effective the regime is. To determine
this it is necessary to consider how common market abuse
and insider dealing are. The FSA themselves have
published an analysis which measured the extent to which
share prices moved ahead of the regulatory
announcements that companies are required to make. The
analysis focused on two areas; those relating to takeover
bids and announcements about trading performance made
by FTSE 350 companies. An assessment was then made of
the proportion of these that were preceded by abnormal
share price movements. The research did not prove how
much market abuse was taking place, but it did suggest that
28.9 per cent of takeover announcements and 21.7 per
cent of trading announcements were preceded by
transactions that were probably based on inside
information.
This leads on to the real problem with the market abuse
regime. It suggests that although there has been a clear
acceleration in the number of insider dealing cases dealt
with (most of the FSA market abuse actions have been
insider dealing matters) little is being done that is effective
in the context of the scale of the problem. The rate of the
increase in the number of insider dealing cases dealt with
since the market abuse regime came into effect is minimal
in the context of these statistics. A fundamental appraisal
of how evidence can be gleaned and such cases handled
needs to be put in place. Such a programme should find it
more effective to look at methods of advancing the process
of obtaining details of who is behind the suspicious
transactions referred to above rather than focusing on
further changes in the law. The real problem facing the FSA
is the extreme difficulty in ascertaining when market
abuse/insider dealing occurs. The legislative system has
probably done all that can be required of it in terms of the
definition of the offence. It is the policing and analysis
elements of the criminal behaviour concerned that is the
Achilles heel of the whole regime.
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